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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the International Great Depression in the
US and Western Europe using the business cycle accounting method a
la Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (CKM 2007). We extend the business
cycle accounting model by incorporating endogenous factor utilization
which turns out to be an important transmission mechanism of the
disturbances in the economy. Our main ndings are that in the U.S.
labor wedges account for roughly half of the drop in output while e¢ -
ciency and investment wedges each account for a quarter of it during
the 1929-1933 period while in Western Europe labor wedges account
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1929-1932 period. Our 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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the Great Depressions in the U.S. and Western
Europe using the business cycle accounting method of Chari, Kehoe and Mc-
Grattan (CKM 2007) with an extension to incorporate endogenous factor
utilization. We quantify the importance of labor and capital market distor-
tions as well as production ine¢ ciencies in order to understand the di¤erences
and similarities of the output performance between the Western Europe and
the U.S. over the 1925-1938 period. We nd that endogenous factor utiliza-
tion plays an important role in transmitting the disturbances to the economy.
Our quantitative results show that labor market distortions and deteriora-
tion in production e¢ ciency are important in accounting for the depressions
in both economies while investment wedges contribute to the output drop in
the U.S. but not in Western Europe.
In order to discuss the economic situation in the world during the inter-
war period, we construct a unique data set of GDP, private consumption,
investment, employment, and hours worked for 12 Western European coun-
tries, form a hypothetical aggregate Western European economy and com-
pare it to the U.S. Due to data availability, the sample European countries
are limited to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and UK.1 Figures 1a and 1b present
the per capita output, consumption, investment and employment in the U.S.
and the Western Europe economy normalized at 1925 = 0.2 In the U.S.,
output fell dramatically by approximately 0.44 in terms of log di¤erences
between 1929 and 1933, which is equivalent to a 36% drop. Consumption,
investment and employment all collapsed along with output by 0.26, 1.17 and
0.21. All variables show recovery after 1933, however, none of them return
to their 1929 level by 1939. In the Western Europe, output hits its trough
in 1932. The log di¤erence between the 1929 and 1932 level is 0.16. Con-
sumption, Investment and employment also fall by 0.09, 0.41 and 0.12 during
this period. While output, investment and employment shows recovery after
1932, consumption keeps falling throughout the 1930s.
Over the past 80 years, the source and mechanism of the International
Great Depression (IGD) has been a heated topic of interest. Literature on
1The sources of the data series are listed in the data appendix.
2Output, consumption and investment are detrended by the long run per capita out-
put growth rate over the 1900-2008 period. Employment is not detrended because it is
considered a mean stationary variable.
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IGD emerged from the research on the Great Depression by shifting its focus
from the United States to other countries. The literature can be split into two
main strands based on their proposed origin of the Great Depression. The
rst strand maintains that the monetary contraction in the United States is
at the heart of the Great Depression (e.g. Eichengreen 1992). Specically,
the U.S. monetary contraction in 1928 aimed to stem the stock market boom
and prevent a gold outow caused a rise in interest rates and deation, which
was exported to the rest of the world due to the Gold Standard. Figure 2
illustrates the main point by clearly showing that both the U.S. and Western
Europe were facing substantial drops in the prices. The literature identied
two channels through which worldwide deation led to the IGD: labor market
distortions and capital market distortions. As for the former, Bernanke and
Carey (1996), for example, estimate aggregate supply and wage adjustment
equations and show that nominal wage stickiness propagated the negative ef-
fect of monetary shocks on output in 22 countries. As for the latter, Bernanke
and James (1991), for example, argue that nancial crises caused by debt de-
ation had a negative impact on industrial output using data from a sample
of 24 countries during 1930-36.3
The second strand of literature on the IGD turns to non-monetary shocks.
Temin (1976) argues that a housing recession and declining consumer spend-
ing led by pessimism drove the U.S. economy into depression. Harrison and
Weder (2006) use a sunspot model in which animal spirits a¤ect investors
expectations and nd that a collapse in investment led to the downturn in the
U.S. In a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we can in-
terpret pessimistic animal spirits as negative expectational shocks that man-
ifest themselves as distortions in the investment market. Cole and Ohanian
(1999) provide an alternative non-monetary approach to understand the U.S.
Great Depression by using a standard neoclassical growth model. They show
that total factor productivity (TFP) alone can account for 40 percent of the
decline in output between 1929 and 1933.4 This study led to a series of
research on the Great Depressions in various countries using the neoclassi-
cal growth model evaluating the role of TFP.5 In the follow up paper, Cole,
3More detailed review of the literature and evidence is provided in the next section.
4Ohanian (2001) further investigates the sources of the TFP drop in the US during the
Great Depression and claims that the loss of organizational capital due to bankruptcies is
the most convincing candidate among others.
5Cole and Ohanian (2002) study the UK interwar depression and show that the drop
in output was due to the decline in the labor input rather than TFP and conclude that
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Ohanian and Leung (2005) study IGD in a sample of 17 countries and using
a signal extraction model with monetary and productivity shocks they nd
that productivity shocks explain two-thirds of the drop in output.6 In further
examination of the non-monetary causes of the Great Depression, Cole and
Ohanian (2013) nd that cartelization policies account for about 40 percent
of the squared change in output and 60 percent of the square changed in la-
bor for a sample of 7 countries including the large depressions in U.S., Italy,
Germany and Australia.
We use business cycle accounting to shed light on the factors behind the
IGD in Western Europe and the U.S. The strength of the business cycle ac-
counting method is that we can quantify the importance of each distortion
on the IGD within a unied dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
The original business cycle accounting method introduced by CKM (2007)
proceeds as follows. First, a competitive equilibrium in a prototype neoclas-
sical growth model is dened. Next, "wedges" in the equilibrium conditions
are computed using the data of output, consumption, investment and total
hours worked. These wedges are dened as exogenous disturbances in rele-
vant markets: e¢ ciency wedges are disturbances to the production process;
government wedges are disturbances in the resources available to private
agents; labor wedges are distortions in the labor market; investment wedges
are distortions in the capital market. Finally, the responses of endogenous
variables to wedges are computed by simulating the model with one wedge
at a time.
This paper makes an important modication to the original CKM (2007)
model by disentangling the uctuation of factor utilization from disturbances
in production e¢ ciency. We do so by incorporating endogenous capital and
labor market policies were to blame. Amaral and MacGee (2002) study the Canadian
case and show that the TFP slow down can account for more than half of the output
drop during the Great Depression. Beaudry and Portier (2002) show that movements in
inputs in response to a stagnation in investment specic technical progress are su¢ cient
to account for the French Great Depression without relying on declines in TFP. Fisher
and Hornstein (2002) investigate the German case and nd that total factor productivity,
countercyclical real wage shocks and scal policy shocks were all important in accounting
for the Great Depression. Kehoe and Perri (2002) show that trade restrictions and real
wage regidities are su¢ cient to account for the Great Depression in Italy without changes
in TFP.
6In addition, Ritschl and Woitek (2000) and Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009) used VAR and
FAVAR models to examine the role of monetary policy in the US and nd that it has only
a modest role in explaining the decline of real activities in US.
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labor utilization following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) and
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993) respectively. Endogenous factor
utilization a¤ects the measurement of production e¢ ciency by incorporating
unobserved uctuations in factor inputs. This is important as distortions in
the factor markets a¤ect output not only through the quantity of inputs but
also through their e¤ects on factor utilization.
Our quantitative results show that in the U.S. labor wedges account for
roughly half of the drop in output while e¢ ciency and investment wedges
each account for a quarter of it during the 1929-1933 period. In Western
Europe labor wedges account for one-third of the output drop and e¢ ciency,
government and investment wedges account for the remaining during the
1929-1932 period. In terms of the persistence of the depression, in the U.S.
e¢ ciency and labor wedges account for roughly one-third and two-thirds of
the recovery in output respectively. In Europe the improvement in govern-
ment wedges alone would have led to a recovery more rapid than in the data
while the deterioration in e¢ ciency counteracts with these forces.
Our method is also used to study the role of the interwar Gold Standard
played as the transmission mechanism of the Great Depression across coun-
tries. Our results suggest that government wedges, which include the trade
balance, contributed to the recovery of the countries which left the Gold
Standard in the early 1930s. This is consistent with the view that depreci-
ation of currencies that left the Gold Standard stimulated foreign demand
of goods and improved the trade balance (e.g. Eichengreen and Sachs 1985,
Eichengreen and Irvin 2010). Our results also show that investment and labor
wedges prolonged the depression in the countries that left the Gold Standard
later in the mid-1930s. This is consistent with the view that deationary
pressure generated by the Gold Standard distorted the factor markets.
Finally, we compare the results with the 2008 Great Recession by con-
ducting business cycle accounting over the 1999-2012 period using the same
model. The Great Recession drew attention to the IGD as these episodes are
both considered as worldwide economic crises originated by the U.S. econ-
omy. We nd that in the U.S. labor wedge accounts for all of the output
drop over the 2007-2012 period. On the other hand, in Europe e¢ ciency
wedges account for half of the output drop while labor wedges account for
a quarter. The results imply that the nature of the Great Recession seems
di¤erent from that of the IGD.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. In section 2, we
review the literature on market distortions during the IGD. In section 3, we
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describe the business cycle accounting model with endogenous factor utiliza-
tion. In section 4, we present the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Market Distortions and The International
Great Depression
As was mentioned in the previous section, in the past three decades, the
Great Depression has been increasingly considered a global phenomenon not
only because it a¤ected many countries, but mainly because of the global
character of its transmission. Indeed, several papers (Choudhri and Kochin
1980, Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Temin 1989, Eichengreen 1992, Bernanke
and James 1991, Bernanke and Carey 1996) examined possible transmission
mechanisms and concluded that the International Great Depression had its
roots in the interwar Gold Standard (often called gold exchange standard).
The times of the interwar period Gold Standard were the times of capital
mobility and xed exchange rates which meant that high interest rates in
one country led to high interest rates in the rest of the countries on Gold
Standard as a result of interest rate arbitrage. Hence a deationary policy
in one country could have been transmitted to other countries through the
operation of the Gold Standard regime. That explanation has called for
further investigation of the channels through which the decline of money
supply a¤ected real economic activities; in other words, to explain the non-
neutrality of money. Extensive research over the past decades has found that
distortions on the labor and capital markets caused the decline of money
supply to a¤ect real economy. In this section, we discuss the ndings of that
literature.
2.1 The Labor Market
The interwar period presents a break-up from pre-1914 labor markets which
were characterized by little or no welfare policies and very little unionization
(Ritschl and Strausmann 2010, Feinstein et al. 2008). Post WWI period,
on the other hand, witnessed a rise of social institutions promoting welfare
policies and unemployment benets, increase in unionization, and collective
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bargaining.7 The timing of this development was di¤erent in Europe and the
U.S. While Europe had witnessed those changes already in the 1920s, the U.S.
labor market had become more rigid largely during the New Deal policies in
the 1930s. The e¤ect of labor market institutions on unemployment in the
inter-war period is still debated (e.g. Eichengreen and Hatton 1988). Indeed,
while there were countries with high unemployment throughout the entire
inter-war period (e.g. UK, Denmark, Sweden); other countries experienced
high unemployment only in the 1930s (e.g. France, Belgium, Germany). On
the other hand, there seems to be an emerging consensus about the role of
nominal wage rigidities in the propagation of the Great Depression, usually
ascribed to labor market institutions which made labor market adjustment,
if not rigid, then very slow.
The main story of the nominal wage stickiness during the Great Depres-
sion goes as follows. If the nominal wages are inelastic, rms cannot adjust
to deation, face high real wages and respond by laying o¤workers or curtail-
ing production. Empirical assessment of the link between deation, nominal
wages, and real output has been carried out in several papers. Eichengreen
and Sachs (1985), using a sample of ten European countries in 1935, show a
negative relationship between real wages and industrial production which is
suggestive of nominal-wages stickiness. Newel and Symons (1988) investigate
14 countries during the Great Depression in an attempt to uncover the trans-
mission mechanism of negative monetary shocks leading to the spread of the
Great Depression across countries. They show that the interwar economies
were characterized by substantial nominal rigidities on the supply side which
led to an increase in the real wage, hence high unemployment and low out-
put. Bernanke and Carey (1996) extended Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) by
carrying out an extensive empirical analysis of nominal wages behavior for
twenty two countries in 1931-1936 and found a substantial degree of nom-
inal wage stickiness. Similar result was found by Dimsdale et al. (1989)
by analyzing the behavior of real wages in Britain from the mid-1920s to
1938. Specically, they estimates show nominal wage inertia in that period
and maintain that inexibility of the supply side of the economy and wage
setting behavior enabled the price shocks to have real impact on the econ-
omy. The ndings of those studies are consistent with the literature on the
7The role of unemployment benets was extensively studied for the UK, going back to
Benjamin and Kochin (1979) (e.g. Crafts 1989). Other studies for the UK stressed the
role of unionization and eight-hour day on labor supply (Broadberry 1986, Broadberry
1990).
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European labor markets which nds that they had become less exible in the
interwar period (e.g. Eichengreen and Hatton, 1988).8 This was because the
rise of collective bargaining, advent of unemployment insurance, and grow-
ing power of labor unions caused nominal wages to adjust only slowly to the
changes in the economy.9
The role of labor market rigidities has also been prominent in the studies
investigating very slow and uneven recovery from the Great Depression in
the U.S. Some studies have argued that the New Deal programs caused labor
market not to clear, leading to a very slow recovery (Bordo et al. 2000, Cole
and Ohanian 2004). Very recent empirical investigation of the New Deal
relief spending by Neumann et al. (2010) nds that even though it increased
employment and earning in the short-run, its long-run e¤ect was negative as it
crowded out private sector jobs. Since the peak of unemployment was reached
before the New Deal policies, several studies analyzed Hoovers high-wage
policies and their contribution to nominal wage rigidity (e.g. Vedder and
Galloway 1993, Ebell and Ritschl 2008, Ohanian 2009). A conclusion that we
can draw is that even if the loss of jobs might not have been directly caused
by the Hoovers policies and the New Deal, they created an environment
which made downward real wage adjustment di¢ cult (Hatton and Thomas
2010).10
To illustrate the arguments reviewed above, Figure 3 presents the real
wages in the U.S. and Western Europe.11 In both economies the real wages
rise dramatically during the early 1930s.12 This is consistent with the em-
8Recently, several studies have also explored the role of wage rigidities on country-basis.
Fisher and Hornstein (2002) nd that in Germany, real wages were above their market
clearing levels and thus contributed to the decline of output during the Great Depression.
The role of real wage rigidities was studied for Italy as well (Perri and Quadrini 2002).
Though arguing that the fall of international trade was a major cause of output fall in
Italy, that drop was amplied by the real wage stickiness.
9This conclusion is not unchallenged. Madsen (2004) argues that price rather than
wage stickiness played a major role in the propagation of the Great Depression.
10Eggertson (2012) studies the impact of NIRA and the New Deal policies within a
model with staggered price setting. He nds that the anti-competitive policies could have
been expansionary under emergency conditions with zero interest rate bounds and large
deationary shocks.
11The real wage is computed as the nominal wage in industry divided by the wholesale
price index. The real wage is detrended by the long run output growth rate and normalized
at 1925=0 since the units are not comparable. For the Western Europe the normalized
real wages are summed weighted by the output share of each country at 1925.
12Rising real wages in Europe and North America has been extensively documented by
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pirical ndings in the literature that nominal wage stickiness and deation
increased the cost of labor. In the U.S., the real wage remained well above
the 1925 level during the late 1930s, unlike that in Europe which returned
the 1925 level in 1937. The fact that the real wage remained high in the
U.S. is consistent with the literature that views the New Deal policies as the
cause of the increased the bargaining power of labor unions. We show in
the appendix that both monetary shocks with sticky wages and time varying
labor union bargaining power distort the labor market in a similar way.
2.2 The Capital Market
Similarly to the labor market distortions, the capital markets experienced
substantial distortions during the Great Depression years which caused the
decline of money supply to a¤ect real economy. Three channels were dis-
cussed in the literature: nominal interest rate rigidity, bank failures, and
pessimistic expectations.
Rigid nominal interest rates distort capital markets by a¤ecting the real
interest rate. If the nominal interest rate fully adjusts to nominal shocks,
the deation will be cancelled out by the drop in nominal interest rates and
real interest rates will remain constant. However, when the nominal interest
rate does not fully adjust, money neutrality does not hold. The lack of ad-
justment can occur due to passive monetary policy (Friedman and Schwartz
1963) or when the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound (Eggert-
son 2012). Rising real interest rates should discourage current consumption
and investment through the intertemporal optimization of the agents. Figure
4 illustrates the point by presenting the real interest rates in the U.S. and
Western Europe.13
In both economies the real interest rate rises dramatically over the 1929-
1931 period reecting the huge deation during this period. This corresponds
to the drop in investment and consumption in both countries shown in Figure
1. After 1931 the real interest rate in both countries falls dramatically, which
corresponds to the recovery of investment in both economies. While the
Williamson (1995).
13The real interest rate is dened as the nominal policy discount rate minus the expected
ination rate of the wholesale price. We dene the expected ination rate as the average
of the actual ination and the ination of the previous year. The real interest rate for
Europe is an average of individual country rates weighted by the output share of each
country in 1925.
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investment in Europe returns to the 1925 level by 1936, that in the U.S.
does not recover despite the real interest rate dropping below zero during
the 1933-1936 period. Therefore, the change in real interest rates does not
seem to be the only issue in the capital market.
Another channel linking deation and real output proposed by the liter-
ature is bank failures which caused the decline of money supply (e.g. Fried-
man and Schwartz, 1963) and increasing costs of credit intermediation (e.g.
Bernanke 1983). In the U.S., the waves of bank failures led to the nation-wide
bank closure by president Roosevelt in March 1933.14 In Europe, countries
also experienced banking crisis, though the banking system was not disrupted
as severely as in the U.S.15 The exceptions are Austria and Germany. Austria
was the rst one to experience a banking crisis which peaked in May 1931
when its largest deposit bank, Creditanstalt, failed.16 Germany also experi-
enced run on banks and German mark resulting in the failure of Danatbank,
the second largest bank in the country when it went bankrupt in July 1931.17
To illustrate the arguments above, Table 1 presents the growth rates of
money in our sample countries. We dene money as the sum of central bank
issues, deposit in commercial banks and deposit in savings banks, which
corresponds to M2. This table shows that the decline in money supply in
Austria, Germany and the U.S. was much more severe than in the other
countries. This supports the view that banking crises led to a fall in the
supply of credit, which in turn reduced lending and output.18
14December 1930: failure of Bank of the United States. August to October 1931: a
series of banking panics and failures of 1860 banks. June 1932: a series of bank failures in
Chicago. October 1932: a series of bank failures in Midwest and Far West.
15Indeed, according to Bernanke and James (1991), countries like Denmark, Finland,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK survived the depression years without
general banking crises. Reasons for relatively mild banking crises on the European conti-
nent include sound banking structure, the proactive role of government and central banks,
and exchange-rate policies (Feinstein et al. 2008, Grossman 1994).
16Being one of the largest short-term debtors in Europe, very close relationships between
the banks and industry, and a long-lasting negative impact of the collapse of Austria-
Hungary made the banking sector very vulnerable to the Depression. The collapse of the
Credit-Anstalt had not only a profound impact on the domestic economy, but also caused
the bank crisis to spread to other countries as well (Eichengreen 1992, Feinstein et al.
2008).
17Even though it is generally viewed as a twin crisis largely independent from the events
in Austria (e.g. Feinstein et al. 2008), it was argued that the events in Austria had a
signicant indirect impact on the crisis in Germany (Eichengreen 1992).
18Temin (1976), on the other hand, argues that the decline in money stock was due to
10
Table 1. The Growth Rate of Money Supply
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Austria 12:2  15:3  20:5  5:2 1:6
Belgium 12:5 8:3  2:2  0:3 1:1
Denmark 4:5  3:0  1:1 3:5 0:7
Finland 4:4  1:8  1:7 4:7 4:6
France 10:9 7:3 4:2  1:9  0:8
Germany 0:1  16:6  10:7 5:3 6:1
Italy 9:1 2:3 4:7 5:4 1:9
Netherlands 6:5  4:1 2:8  3:1  2:5
Norway  3:8  4:7  4:9  4:4  4:5
Spain 9:8  3:8 3:1 3:5 4:0
Sweden 4:2 0:6 2:3 2:2 1:5
UK 3:1  6:9 9:3 4:1 4:0
U.S. 1:3  4:7  11:7  2:9 4:5
There is a substantial literature analyzing the cause of the banking crisis
during the Great Depression.19 Recently, however, a few studies emerged
attempting to quantify the impact of banking crises on output. Bernanke
and James (1991) examine the e¤ect of banking crisis on industrial output
on a sample of 24 countries in 1930-36. They found a large negative e¤ect
 a bank panic was estimated to reduce industrial output by more than
16 percentage points. Calomiris and Mason (2003b) follow upon Bernanke
(1983) and test his hypothesis that banking crises led to an increase in the
cost of credit intermediation which then negatively a¤ected output. They
nd that the decrease in the growth of loan supply signicantly reduced U.S.
state income.
The third channels through which the capital markets can inuence real
economy during the Great Depression was advocated by Temin (1976) who
argues that the pessimistic expectations of private agents led to a collapse
the decrease in money demand.
19The focus in the literature has been whether bank failures were caused by illiquidity
or insolvency (Richardson 2007). Calomiris and Mason (2003a) nd that fundamentals 
both the attributes of individual banks and the exogenous shocks that a¤ected their health
 had close links with the likelihood of US bank failures over the 1930 to 1933 period.
There is also a substantial body of research on the role of central banks, bank regulation,
and bank structure on propagation of banking crisis during the Great Depression, e.g.
Grosmann (1994), Mitchener (2005), Mitchener (2007), Richardson and Troost (2007),
Carlson and Mitchener (2009).
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in aggregate demand and the decline in money stock was due to the endoge-
nous decrease in money demand. Harrison and Weder (2006) follow-up on
this view and construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
sunspot shocks in investment and show that negative expectation shocks es-
timated from interest spread data can account for the U.S. Great Depression
and slow recovery. We show in the appendix that a model with expecta-
tion shocks to future output can operate as a distortion in the investment
market.20
In sum, there is a substantial body of research which argues for substantial
distortions of the labor and capital markets during the Great Depression and
growing literature which empirically shows how those distortions transmit the
negative money supply shocks into the real economy. The following sections,
using the business cycle accounting, quantify the importance of labor and
capital market distortions in Western Europe and the U.S. respectively.
3 The Benchmark Model
3.1 Household
The representative households lifetime utility is dened as
E0
P
t
t

	 ln ct + (1 	)
 
ln (1  lt)  ltul;t

(1)
where the arguments are consumption ct, labor supply lt and labor utilization
ul;t respectively. In this model, labor supply is dened as the fraction of
population that is employed. We assume that the household allocates a
fraction of people into the labor market to earn wage and the rest at home
to provide home services. For simplicity, we assume that the production of
home services is a linear function of the fraction of the non-employed members
(1  lt), which leads to a utility gain of (1   	) ln (1  lt). Market labor is
costly not only because it reduces home services, but also because market
labor incurs disutility from the intensity of working. That is, the higher the
labor utilization rate the higher the utility cost of working, (1 	)ltul;t.
The household maximizes the utility (1) subject to the following budget
20CKM (2007) shows that nancial frictions can be mapped into a prototype business
cycle accounting model with invesment wedges.
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constraint
!l;twtul;tlt + !k;trtuk;tkt + t +  t = ct + xt:
The household earns labor income from the rm, which depends on the em-
ployment level and its utilization rate, i.e. the e¤ective labor supply: ul;tlt.
The household also owns the capital stock kt and rents this to the rm to
earn capital income, which depends on the amount of capital rented adjusted
for its utilization rate, i.e. the e¤ective capital uk;tkt. Labor and capital in-
come are a¤ected by distortions in the labor and capital market, !l;t and
!k;t, which we dene as labor and investment wedges respectively. In ad-
dition, the household receives rm prots t as the owner of the rm and
transfer income from the government  t. The household uses income from
these sources in order to nance consumption and investment xt.
Capital stock accumulates according to the following capital law of motion
 kt+1 = xt + (1  t)kt;
where the depreciation rate t depends on the utilization rate of capital stock
as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988):
t = u

t :
In this model, the household chooses the level of both labor and capital
utilization. From the households perspective, a rise in labor utilization in-
creases labor income but it is costly due to the utility cost. On the other
hand, capital utilization increases capital income whereas it is costly as it
increases the depreciation rate of capital.
3.2 Firm
The representative rm produces a single nal good using e¤ective labor ul;tlt
and e¤ective capital uk;tkt which it hires from the household at the rates of
wt and rt, respectively. Therefore, the rms prot maximization problem is
as follows:
maxt = yt   wtul;tlt   rtuk;tkt:
For the production technology, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion:
yt = !e;t (uk;tkt)
 (ul;tlt)
1 
where !e;t is the time varying productivity of the rm, which we dene as
e¢ ciency wedges.
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3.3 Government
The government collects labor and capital income taxes from the household
in order to nance its exogenous purchases gt. The remainder is transferred
to the household in a lumpsum fashion. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is:
(1  !l;t)wtul;tlt + (1  !k;t) rtuk;tkt =  t + gt:
For convenience, we rewrite government purchases as a xed government
purchases level g times government wedges !g;t so that gt = g!g;t.
We can combine the household budget constraint, the rms prot and
the government budget constraint to derive the resource constraint of the
economy:
yt = ct + xt + gt:
Since the economy is closed, the trade balance does not appear in the resource
constraint. As the original Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), we treat
the trade balance as part of the government purchases.
3.4 Wedges
In this model, we have four exogenous variables which we dened as wedges:
!t = (!e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t)
0 :
For convenience, we dened them so that their means are equal to one.
We assume that the log deviation of the wedges from their means follow a
rst order vector autoregressive process:
e!t = Pg!t 1 + "t; "t  N(0; V ):
The error terms are assumed to be mean zero, however, there is no restriction
on the variance covariance matrix V . Therefore, wedges are allowed to have
contemporaneous correlations. In terms of the transition matrix P, we follow
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) and impose a restriction such that
3.5 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices
fyt; ct; xt; lt; uk;t; ul;t; kt+1;  t; !e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t; wt; rtg
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such that, (i) the household optimizes given fwt; rtg and f t; !k;t; !l;tg; (ii)
the rm optimizes given fwt; rtg and !e;t; (iii) the government budget con-
straint and the resource constraint holds; and (iv) the wedges follow the
stochastic process.
In summary, the equilibrium is characterized by the following seven equa-
tions:
1
ct
= bEt  1
ct+1

!k;t+1
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  uk;t+1

; (2)
1
1  lt = (  1)u

l;t; (3)
!l;t (1  ) yt
lt
=
1 	
	

  1
ct
1  lt ; (4)
!k;t
yt
kt
= uk;t; (5)
yt = !e;t (uk;tkt)
 (ul;tlt)
1  ; (6)
 kt+1 = xt +
 
1 + uk;t

kt; (7)
1 =
ct
yt
+
xt
yt
+
!g;t
yt
; (8)
where b = = .
4 Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Parameters
The parameters that dene the steady state of the model are calibrated to
target data values assuming that the world is in steady state at 192521. For
simplicity, we assume that utilization rates are equal to one in 1925. The
calibrated parameters and steady states are listed in Table 2.
21The exceptions are Germany and Denmark where we assume that they are in steady
state at 1925 and 1921 respectively.
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Table 2. Parameter and Steady State Values
Parameters Steady States
U.S. Europe U.S. Europeb 0.96 0.96 c=y 0.731 0.788
 0.1 0.1 x=y 0.199 0.132
 0.333 0.333 y=k 0.661 0.934
  1.032 1.023 l 0.383 0.438
 1.417 1.417 !e 1 1
 1.219 1.343 !g=y 0.070 0.080
	 0.791 0.783 !k 0.643 0.455
 7.388 5.186 !l 1 1
Due to data restrictions, we could not calibrate the subjective discount
factor b, capital depreciation rate  and the capital income share .22 There-
fore, we assume 0:96, 0:1 and 0:333 for b,  and  respectively. The growth
trend   is computed as the average growth rate of total GDP over the 1900-
2008 period. We compute the consumption to output ratio c=y, investment
to output ratio x=y and employment to population ratio l directly from the
data in 1925. The output to capital ratio y=k is calibrated to match the
investment to output ratio x=y in equation (7). The steady state e¢ ciency
wedge !e is normalized at one as this only a¤ects the scale of the economy.
The steady state government wedge to output ratio !g=y is calibrated to
match c=y and x=y in equation (8). The steady state investment wedge is
calibrated to match the output to capital ratio in equation (2). The steady
state labor wedge !l is set equal to 1 as it does not a¤ect any of the results.23
The elasticity of capital utilization is calibrated to match !k and y=k
in equation (5). On the other hand, the elasticity of labor utilization 
cannot be calibrated because we have 2 equations (3) and (4) to pin down
3 parameters, the labor utilization disutility parameter , the preference
weight on consumption 	 and . Therefore, we estimate  jointly with the
22In order to calibrate the depreciation rate  and the capital income share , we need
data of investment to capital stock ratio and capital income. Furthermore, the subjec-
tive discount factor  cannot be directly calibrated in our model using the capital Euler
equation because it involves the level of steady state investment wedges, which is a latent
variable.
23We can only identify the joint level of !l and 	 in equation (4). Neither of them
apppear in the linearized equilibrium conditions so their levels have no impact on the
dynamics.
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stochastic process. Once we estimate , we calibrate  to match l using (3)
and 	 to match !l, l and c=y using (4) respectively.
The parameters in the stochastic process and  are estimated using the
Bayesian method available in DYNARE24. The main reason why we resort to
structural estimation is because our model contains several latent variables.
In particular, we cannot directly observe the levels of investment wedges
because they are dened in an expectational equation and e¢ ciency wedges
because factor utilization are unobservable. The information of the prior and
posterior distributions are listed in the appendix.
4.2 Wedges
In order to reproduce wedges, we rst solve the model for linear decision
rules following Uhlig (1999) so that
gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!teqt = C ekt +D e!t;
where qt is a vector of endogenous observable variables: qt = (yt; ct; xt; lt).
The ~ refers to the log linear deviation of the variable from its steady
state. We rst assume that capital stock and the observables are in steady
state in 1920, which implies that wedges in 1920 in steady state as well.
Therefore, gk1925 = gq1925 = g!1925;= 0: From 1926 and onwards, the wedges
can be computed by solving the system of equations while updating the
capital stock one period ahead by its linear decision rule using the computed
wedges:
e!t = D 1 eqt   C ekt ;gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!t
The computed wedges for the U.S. and Western Europe are plotted in
Figures 5a and 5b. In the U.S., e¢ ciency, government, investment and labor
24We follow CKM (2007) and assume that government wedges do not have spillovers
on other wedges and vice versa. CKM (2007) imposes this restriction to "avoid having
the large movements in government consumption associated with World War I dominate
the estimation of the stochastic process." Although we do not include World War I period
in our sample, we believe that the government consumption in the late 1930s was also
a¤ected by war related expenses. Therefore, we impose the restriction on our estimation.
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wedges all fall during the 1929-1933 period. These all should contribute to
the decline in output during this period. In Western Europe, all wedges
except for e¢ ciency wedges fall during the 1929-1932 period.
A drop in e¢ ciency wedges reduces output directly as well as the demand
for capital and labor. A drop in government wedges leads to an increase in
resources available to the private sector. The positive income e¤ect stimulates
consumption and leisure, which reduces labor utilization and output. A drop
in investment wedges reduces the return on e¤ective capital and thus leads
to a decline in the supply of capital utilization and output. A drop in labor
wedges reduces the return on labor and thus the decline in labor supply and
output. The question is, how large are these e¤ects?
4.3 Simulation
In order to quantify the e¤ects of each wedges, we simulate the model by
plugging in wedges into the model one-by-one and measuring the uctuations
in each endogenous variable. Table 3 summarizes the results. The rst
column for each country shows the di¤erence between the output level in
1929 and at the trough, 1933 in the U.S. and 1932 in the Europe. The
second column presents the di¤erence between the output level in the trough
and in 1938. The third row presents the decomposition of output uctuations
into the contributions of each wedge dened as
contvj = corr(
fv!jt ; evt)  std(fv!jt )std(evt)
=
cov(fv!jt ; evt)
var(evt) ;
where fv!jt is the linearized uctuation of variable v in response to f!j whileevt is that of the data.
Table 3. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output
U.S. Europe
1929-33 1933-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:128 0:054 0:34  0:033  0:041 0:23
Government 0:012 0:008  0:05  0:039 0:107 0:09
Investment  0:100  0:024 0:38  0:033 0:024 0:09
Labor  0:226 0:117 0:33  0:067  0:015 0:58
Data  0:443 0:155 1  0:171 0:075 1
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First, in terms of the depth of the Great Depression, in the U.S. labor
wedges account for half of the drop in output during the 1929-1933 period
while e¢ ciency and investment wedges account for a quarter each.25 In Eu-
rope labor wedges account for more than one-third of the output drop dur-
ing the 1929-1932 period, e¢ ciency, government and investment wedges are
equally responsible for the remaining. Next, in terms of the persistence of
the depression, in the U.S. e¢ ciency and labor wedges account for roughly
one-third and two-thirds of the recovery in output respectively while invest-
ment wedges hinder the recovery over the 1933-1938 period.26 In Europe the
improvement in government wedges alone would have lead to a recovery twice
as rapid as in the data while the deterioration in e¢ ciency counteracts with
these forces. Finally, in terms of overall contribution, in the U.S. e¢ ciency,
investment and labor wedges each account for approximately one-third of
the output uctuation over the 1925-1938 period. In Europe, labor wedges
account for more than half while e¢ ciency wedges account for a quarter of
the output uctuation.
Figures 6a and 6b show the year by year reaction of output to selected
wedges for the U.S. and Western Europe. In the U.S. e¢ ciency wedges alone
does account for a signicant drop in output during the Great Depression
as shown above, however, they predict the trough at 1934. When we simu-
late the model with e¢ ciency and labor wedges, the model correctly predicts
the trough at 1933. Moreover, the magnitude of the Depression is closer
to the data, however, the model cannot fully account for the depth of the
Great Depression. Finally, when we add investment wedges, the three almost
perfectly account for Great Depression and the slow recovery. In Europe ef-
ciency wedges can account for a signicant drop in output, however, they
cannot predict the recovery through the latter half of the 1930s. When we
combine e¢ ciency and labor wedges together, the model generates a depres-
sion with a magnitude much closer to that in the data. However, e¢ ciency
and labor wedges predict the depression to worsen throughout the 1930s.
When we add government wedges, the model almost perfectly accounts for
the Great Depression and the recovery. Therefore, government wedges are
25Our result that investment wedges are important in accounting for the output drop in
the US is di¤erent from CKM (2007) who nds otherwise. We discuss this in more detail
in the following section.
26Our result that labor wedges contribute to the recovery in the US is di¤erent from
CKM (2007) and Cole and Ohanian (2004) that nd otherwise. This issue will be discussed
in detail in the following section.
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important in accounting for the European recovery after 1932.
Our results are informative in terms of discussing the sources of the IGD.
The importance of labor wedges on the U.S. Great Depression lends support
to the view that Hoovers high-wage policies contributed to the severity of
the depression (e.g. Ohanian 2009). One important result is that investment
wedges play a signicant role in accounting for the U.S. Great Depression,
which is in contrast with CKM (2007) that nds that their role is limited.
Our result implies that we cannot reject the possibility that the nancial
turmoil aggravated the depression through a rise in nancial frictions and
deterioration in animal spirits as discussed in previous literature. We show
in the following section that the endogenous factor utilization is the key to
explain the di¤erences in our results. In Western Europe, the importance
of labor wedges can be attributed to the growing inexibility of labor mar-
kets, accompanied by the deationary pressure transmitted through the Gold
Standard, as discussed earlier.
Our results also shed light on the recovery from the IGD. In Western
Europe, investment and government wedges contribute to the recovery while
e¢ ciency and labor wedges dominated recovery in the U.S. The role of gov-
ernment wedges in the recovery of Western Europe is consistent with eco-
nomic history literature. Whilst there has been a debate whether government
policies resembled Keynesian scal push or not (e.g. Ritschl 2002), there is
little doubt that governments tried various policies to induce recovery and to
relieve unemployment (Feinstein et al 2008). In addition, since government
wedges include the trade balance, the improvement in the trade balance in
the countries that abandoned Gold Standard early could have contributed as
well. In terms of investment wedges, one explanation is that rearmament dur-
ing the mid 1930s dramatically increased government investment especially
in Germany, Italy and the UK.27 A rapid increase in military investment with
little marginal economic return should manifest itself as investment wedges
in our model. In addition, Crafts and Mills (2013) has shown that govern-
ment expenditure provided a boost to real GDP after 1935 driven by the
response of private sector to the news of massive future defense spending.
In the U.S. improvement of labor wedges contribute to recovery, which is
27In Germany, the work-creation program and motorway building program were ac-
companied by the Nazi economic planning, which brought about the revitalization of
investment and the rise of government expenditure, mainly due to rearmament (Temin
1991). In Italy, Mussolini launched a program of public works and, following Germany,
also embarked on large military spending.
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surprising given the literature blaming labor policies during this period for
prolonging the Great Depression (CKM 2007, Cole and Ohanian 2004). We
discuss this issue in detail in the following section.
It is interesting to point out the similarities and di¤erences in the roles
played by e¢ ciency wedges in both economies. In both the U.S. and West-
ern Europe e¢ ciency wedges account for a signicant drop in output in the
early 1930s. This is an important nding as after decomposing TFP into
endogenous factor utilization and exogenous production e¢ ciency, we nd
that supply side shocks still have signicant impact on the IGD. In terms
of the recovery, while e¢ ciency hindered output growth in Western Europe
while it facilitated it in the U.S. This is consistent with recent research by
Field (2006) who shows that in the U.S. both labor and capital productivity
and hence TFP were growing in the depression years which resulted from
advances in manufacturing sector combined with advances in transportation,
distribution, and public utilities. Feinstein et al (2008) show that European
labor productivity rises during the IGD. However, we nd that e¢ ciency, tak-
ing capital accumulation and factor utilization into consideration, actually
falls and surpresses output growth over the recovery period.
4.4 Discussion
Our benchmark results lead to several discussions. First we will discuss how
our setting di¤ers from CKM (2007) and the implication of these di¤erences.
The most important di¤erence is that we assume time-varying factor uti-
lization which is not considered in their model. Another di¤erence is that
they consider total hours worked, which is the product of employment and
hours worked per workers, as labor input whereas we consider employment
as labor input and separately dene labor utilization which includes hours
worked per worker. We show that these di¤erences cause discrepancies in
results28. Next we assess whether there are di¤erences across countries that
28There are also di¤erences in data series besides the labor input. First, we use consump-
tion expenditure as consumption whereas CKM (2007) uses expenditure on non-durables
and services as consumption. Since we do not have data on expenditure on durables for
most European countries, we could not make this adjustment. Next, we use gross xed
capital formation as investment whereas CKM (2007) uses private gross xed capital for-
mation and includes government investment in government wedges. Since we do not have
separate data for private and government investment, we could not make this adjustment
as well.
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abandoned the Gold Standard shortly after the outbreak of IGD and those
that remained on the Gold Standard longer during the IGD. Finally, we dis-
cuss the similarities and di¤erences between the IGD and the recent Great
Recession. All simulations presented in this section are based on reestimated
parameters given that we use di¤erent model settings or data samples.
4.4.1 Factor Utilization and TFP
One important di¤erence between our model and that of CKM (2007) is that
we consider endogenous capital and labor utilization. Consequently, our
denition of e¢ ciency wedges is di¤erent from theirs. CKM (2007) denes
e¢ ciency wedges as the Solow residual:
fAt = eyt   ekt   (1  )elt:
On the other hand, we dene e¢ ciency wedges as
g!e;t = eyt    ekt + fuk;t  (1  )elt + ful;t : (9)
The discrepancy between Solow residuals and our measure of e¢ ciency wedges
are fAt  g!e;t = fuk;t + (1  )ful;t:
Therefore, Solow residuals are a poor measure of productivity if factor uti-
lization rates uctuate over the business cycle.29
In order to illustrate the e¤ect of factor utilization on output uctua-
tion, we simulated the model with constant factor utilization. This model
corresponds to the original model of CKM (2007). Table 4 shows that with-
out endogenous factor utilization e¢ ciency wedges would have accounted for
most of the depression, recovery and over all uctuation in output in both
economies. Therefore, endogenous factor utilization is an important channel
for the transmission of factor market distortions and without these channels
we would signicantly understate their contributions.30
29Another discrepancy is the denition of labor. We use employment whereas CKM
(2007) uses total hours worked. We will explicitly discuss this in the next section.
30Cole and Ohanian (2013) and Weder (2006) also show that capital utilization is im-
portant in accounting for the US Great Depression.
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Table 4. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output: Constant Utilization
U.S. Europe
1929-33 1933-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:292 0:194 0:61  0:167 0:024 1:09
Government 0:003  0:004  0:02  0:009 0:030  0:01
Investment  0:044  0:081 0:21 0:033 0:020  0:31
Labor  0:110 0:046 0:21  0:028 0:000 0:23
Data  0:443 0:155 1  0:171 0:075 1
Next, we consider how each wedge a¤ects the factor utilization rates.
First, we focus on the uctuation of capital utilization. Figures 7a and 7b
present the simulated capital utilization in U.S. and Europe. Since capital
utilization is a latent variable in our model, the data series refers to the sim-
ulated capital utilization in the model with all wedges. The gures show that
capital utilization drops dramatically during the IGD in both economies. In
the U.S., labor wedges are the most important in accounting for the drop in
capital utilization while in Europe investment wedges are the most impor-
tant. Next we investigate the e¤ect of labor utilization. Figures 8a and 8b
present the simulated labor utilization. Labor utilization also drops sharply
during the IGD. Labor wedges account for most of the drop in labor utiliza-
tion in both economies. In Western Europe government wedges cause labor
utilization to rise dramatically in the second half of the 1930s. These gures
show that the factor utilization uctuated quite dramatically during the IGD
and that Solow residuals are not a good measure of production e¢ ciency.
4.4.2 Labor and Hours Worked
Another di¤erence between our model and CKM (2007) is the denition of
labor. The standard business cycle accounting literature denes labor input
as total hours worked, i.e. the product of employment and hours worked per
worker, while we dene labor as employment and consider hours worked per
worker as part of labor utilization which is a latent variable. This denition
is convenient for us because the data of hours worked is not available for
several European countries. However, data of hours worked per worker is
certainly available for the U.S. The data of employment per capita and hours
worked per worker in the U.S. is shown in Figure 9. This gure shows that
hours worked per worker fell by roughly the same amount as employment and
remained much lower than employment after the depression. Therefore, total
hours worked decreased much more and remained lower than employment.
23
There is a literature which tries to explain the di¤erences between em-
ployment and hours worked. Specically, several papers have attempted to
quantify the e¤ect of 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act and later the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act as well as Presidents Reemployment Agreement
of 1933 on employment, real wages, and hours worked. These acts intro-
duced codes which included xed prices, minimum wages, and maximum
hours worked. One of the rationales was that by reducing the workweek
from about 40-45 hours to around 35 hours, work could be sharedamong
more people. Bernanke (1986) and Taylor (2011) nd that New Deal policies
contributed to reducing hours worked and increasing employment.
In relation with the discrepancy between our results and CKM (2007),
since total hours worked remained lower than employment during the recov-
ery period, e¢ ciency wedges dened in (9) computed with employment as
the measure of labor recover slower than those computed with total hours
worked. In addition, labor wedges
f!l;t = ect + 1
1  l
elt   eyt;
computed with employment recover faster than those computed with total
hours worked. This is why, unlike CKM (2007) which denes labor as total
hours worked, we nd that labor wedges lead to a much more rapid recovery
than e¢ ciency wedges do.
In our model, the discrepancy between labor utilization and hours worked
per worker can be considered as the level of e¤ort as dened in Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993). As shown in Figure 8b, labor utilization in
the U.S. recovers rapidly after 1933. We can interpret this result that while
the hours worked per worker remained low, the level of e¤ort per worker was
rising. Unfortunately we have no data on workerse¤ort, however, it is not
hard to imagine that workerse¤ort could rise when the depression persists
and the fear of unemployment remains high.
4.4.3 The Gold Standard
As was argued earlier in the paper, the research over the past few decades
concluded that the deationary pressures were transmitted across countries
through the operation of the Gold Standard and that the distortions of the
labor and capital markets channeled that deation into the real economy. As
a consequence, leaving the Gold Standard might have fostered a recovery by
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ending these deationary pressures. Indeed, several papers (e.g. Eichengreen
and Sachs 1985, Eichengreen 1992, Cole and Ohanian 2013) showed that the
countries which left the Gold Standard early on experienced a faster recovery
than the countries which stayed on gold longer. In this section we are going to
contribute to that debate by discussing the implications of our ndings from
the business cycle accounting for the recovery from the Great Depression
taking into account the adherence to the Gold Standard.
There are several reasons, discussed in the literature, why the abandon-
ment of the Gold Standard could have led to the recovery of the Early
Leavers. Leaving the xed exchange-rate regime allowed currencies to de-
preciate hence to increase countries competitiveness on the international
market which then improved their balance of payment and increased aggre-
gate demand (e.g. Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Eichengreen and Irvin 2010).
Leaving the Gold Standard also removed the imperative of cutting domestic
spending and rising taxes to defend the exchange rate and allowed changing
the expectations from deation to ination thus enabling to escape the liq-
uidity trap (Eichengreen 2008, Eggertsson 2008, Crafts et al 2010). Indeed,
according to Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), once prices began to rise, in-
creased protability - both current as well as future - encouraged investment
which lead to the raising industrial production and recovery. Finally, ina-
tion lowered real wages which then stimulated labor demand (Eichengreen
and Sachs 1985).
Table 5 presents the dates at which each European country changed the
Gold Standard policy according to Bernanke and James (1991) along with the
changes of the detrended output over the 1929-1932 and 1932-1938 periods.
The policy changes from the Gold Standard are either devaluation, foreign
exchange control or suspension. We split the countries into two groups; those
that abandoned the Gold Standard in 1931 which we call the Early Leavers
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK) and
those that abandoned it after 1934 which we call the Late Leavers (Belgium,
France, Italy and the Netherlands). From the aggregate of the two groups,
we cannot nd much di¤erence in the magnitude of the depression in the two
groups while there is a clear di¤erence in the persistence; the Early Leavers
recovered quite rapidly compared to the Late Leavers. Among the countries
that abandoned the Gold Standard in 1931, Denmark and Spain are the
only ones that did not show signicant recovery. However, Denmark did not
experience a large output drop to begin with and the collapse of Spain was
due to the civil war which is exogenous shock unrelated to the Gold Standard.
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Table 5. Changes in the Gold Standard Policies
Early Leavers: Countries Abandoning Gold Standard in 1931
Country Date Policy 1929-32 1932-38
Austria September 1931 Devaluation  0:289 0:073
Denmark September 1931 Suspension  0:040  0:008
Finland October 1931 Suspension  0:138 0:193
Germany July 1931 ForEx Control  0:241 0:288
Norway September 1931 Suspension  0:052 0:055
Spain May 1931 ForEx Control  0:134  0:491
Sweden September 1931 Suspension  0:078 0:137
UK September 1931 Suspension  0:113 0:104
Sub Total - -  0:166 0:127
Late Leavers: Countries Abandoning Gold Standard after 1934
Country Date Policy 1929-32 1932-38
Belgium March 1935 Devaluation  0:144  0:055
France October 1936 Devaluation  0:230 0:007
Italy May 1934 ForEx Control  0:115  0:016
Netherlands October 1936 Devaluation  0:177  0:068
Sub Total - -  0:179  0:017
Although we do not have enough samples to conclude that staying on
the Gold Standard longer led to a slow recovery of the Late Leavers, we
can compare how the distortions on the factor markets interplayed with the
adherence to the deation-transmitting Gold Standard. Table 6 compares
the simulation results for the Early Leavers and Late Leavers. The results
shows that the main source of the depression for the Early Leavers was the
deterioration in the labor wedges while government wedges also played a
signicant role. In terms of the recovery, the government wedges have a
strong positive impact on output growth of the Early Leavers after 1932. On
the other hand, the main source of the depression in the Late Leavers was
the deterioration in the e¢ ciency wedges while investment and labor wedges
also played signicant roles. The sluggish recovery in the Late Leavers was
due to the further deterioration in the investment and labor wedges.
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Table 6. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output: Gold Standard
Early Leavers Late Leavers
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:001  0:067 0:01  0:106 0:012 0:31
Government  0:048 0:126 0:32  0:013 0:054  0:09
Investment  0:020 0:061 0:05  0:023  0:045 0:32
Labor  0:098 0:007 0:62  0:038  0:038 0:46
Data  0:166 0:127 1  0:179  0:017 1
The results that the Early Leavers were primarily a¤ected by labor wedges
while Late Leavers were primarily a¤ected by e¢ ciency wedges gives an in-
teresting comparison. One possible interpretation of this result is that the
Early Leavers left early because the economy su¤ered from labor market
distortions generated by the deation imported through the Gold Standard
while the Late Leavers stayed on the Gold Standard because the economy
was a¤ected primarily by the deterioration in production e¢ ciency rather
than the monetary transmission of the deation. Another interesting result
is that the government wedges played a signicant role in both the depression
and recovery of the Early Leavers while they had less impact on the Late
Leavers. One possible interpretation of this result is that the Early Leavers
who were hit strongly by the deterioration of the trade balance during the
early stage of the depression abandoned the Gold Standard to stimulate for-
eign demand through currency depreciation.31 Finally, the result that the
deterioration of labor wedges further depressed the economy of Late Leavers
is consistent with the view that staying on the Gold Standard prolonged the
deation leading to distortions in the capital and labor markets.32
31On the other hand, the Late Leavers should have su¤ered in the international trade
market from the relative appreciation of their currency while the Early Leavers were
recovering.
32In France, for example, deationary policies prevailed despite the growing domestic
opposition against them. Indeed, even though the government of Pierre-Etienne Flandin,
formed in November 1934, initiated reationary policies, it fell back to the deationary
policies once the xed parity between franc and the gold came under attack. After the
fall of Flandins government in 1935, the new government led by Pierre Laval reversed all
Flandins reationary policies and issued a series of so-called deationary decrees (Moure
1988, Eichengreen 1992). Even when the Front Populaire won the election in May 1936
with the election program of no further deation, France did not leave the Gold Standard
immediately. It was argued that France wanted to coordinate its exit and the devaluation of
franc with Britain (Moure 1988). The announcement of 21bln franc rearmament program
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4.4.4 The Great Recession
Finally, the recent nancial crisis of 2008 drew attention to the IGD as these
episodes are both considered as worldwide economic crises originated by the
U.S. economy. The literature is diverse: there are studies which discuss the
causes of recent crisis (e.g. Brunnermeier 2009, Levine 2010), studies focusing
on the di¤erences in the magnitude between the two crises and the responses
of policy makers (e.g. Almunia et al 2010, Crafts et al 2010, Grossman et al
2010.), then studies which compare the causes of both crises (Temin 2010;
Bordo et al 2009, Bordo et al. 2010), and nally studies which examine the
transmission of the recession across countries (Bagliano et al 2012). Unlike
the research on the IGD, however, research on the recent nancial crisis is
still young and the jury is still out there. The results that we currently
have suggest that insolvency and the fear of insolvency of counterparties
was the deepest problem of recent crisis (Bordo and Landon-Lane 2010) and
that the asset prices were the main channel transmitting shocks of nancial
sector to real economy (Bagliano et al. 2012). Bagliano et al. (2012) also
analyses the transmission of recent recessions across economies and nd that
the contraction of output in the U.S. had a sizable e¤ect on the contraction
of foreign economic growth. In this section we contribute to the research on
the recent nancial crisis by comparing it with the Great Depression using
the same business cycle accounting model.
Table 7 shows the simulation results for Europe and the U.S. over the
1999-2012 period.33 We present the simulated change in output over the
2007-2012 period and the over all contribution of each wedge on output
uctuation. The results show that the main source of the recession in Europe
was the collapse in e¢ ciency. On the other hand, in the U.S. most of the
drop in output can be accounted for by the deterioration in labor wedges.
One remaining issue is that while the literature suggests that the nancial
market played an important role in the recession, investment wedges do not
account for much of the output drops in both economies. Therefore it will
be interesting to consider channels through which nancial frictions lead to
deteriorations in e¢ ciency or labor wedges.
in September 1936, however, provided the nal push to exit the gold standard and France
devaluated in the following weeks (Moure 1988, Eichengreen 1992, Wolf 2008).
33The data sources are OECD and Eurostat data base. Since this period does not involve
large war time expenses, we do not impose any restriction on the stochastic process.
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Table 7. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output: Great Recession
U.S. Europe
2007-12 Cont 2007-12 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:000 0:01  0:062 0:90
Government 0:010  0:11  0:016 0:09
Investment 0:011  0:01  0:014  0:05
Labor  0:127 1:11  0:030 0:07
Data  0:106 1  0:122 1
The key di¤erences between the recent recession and the IGD are reveal-
ing. In the case of the U.S. labor wedges account for all of the output drop
during the recession years of 2007-2012. This is in contrast to the depression
years of 1929-1933 when, e¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges were all
important driving forces of the output drop. In Western Europe, over the
2007-2012 period, half of the output drop was driven by e¢ ciency wedges,
one quarter was driven by labor wedges and the remaining was driven by
government and investment wedges. In contrast, labor wedges were the main
drivers of the output drop during the IGD. In addition, in terms of overall
contribution, labor wedges contributed the most to the U.S. output uctu-
ation while e¢ ciency wedges account for most of the output uctuation in
Europe over the 1999-2012 period. Therefore, in the U.S. labor wedges played
a much more important role, relative to other wedges, in the Great Recession
than it did in the Great Depression while in Europe e¢ ciency wedges played
a much more important role than it did in the IGD.
5 Conclusion and Extensions
In this paper we compare the U.S. andWestern Europe and analyze the Inter-
national Great Depression (IGD) with the business cycle accounting method
assuming endogenous factor utilization. We nd that e¢ ciency and labor
wedges are important in accounting for the Great Depression in Western
Europe while e¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges all contributed to the
Great Depression in the U.S. The result that investment wedges had a signif-
icant negative impact on output in the U.S. implies that banking crisis and
pessimism may have played an important role in the U.S. Great Depression.
The result that labor wedges were most important in both Western Europe
and the U.S. is consistent with the view that labor market distortions caused
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by the deationary forces transmitted through the Gold Standard and rigid
nominal wages are the main source of the IGD. We also nd that labor and
e¢ ciency wedges played an important role in the recovery in the U.S. while
government and investment wedges helped the European recovery.
There are several possible extensions left for future research. First, indi-
vidual country analyses is possible for all Western European countries. This
would help understand the business cycle episodes in each country during
the interwar period. For instance, it would be interesting to compare the
results of countries that have gone through banking crises such as Austria
and Germany to those that havent. Second, our model contains three key
latent variables: e¢ ciency, capital utilization and labor utilization. It would
be helpful to seek for micro-level evidence of the uctuation of these dur-
ing the IGD. Finally, our quantitative results depend on the choice of the
mathematical representation of functions that consist the model, especially
the preference function. Since we do not have knowledge of the true form
of preferences we use the most commonly used preference function, the log
utility. Alternative preferences could be tested, but at the risk of generat-
ing misspecication errors. These will be left for future research as they are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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A Equivalence Results
A.1 Predetermined Wage Model and Labor Wedges
Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), consider a model in which
labor unions have monopoly power on di¤erentiated labor lt(j) and has a
bargaining power on nominal wage contracts that are set one period ahead
of employment. Assume that the total labor lt is as an aggregation of di¤er-
entiated labor
lt =
Z
lt(j)
1
t di
t
;
where t represents the labor unions bargaining power. Following Eggert-
son (2012) we consider this as a time varying parameter. The rms cost
minimization leads to the demand for each di¤erentiated labor
lt(j) =

Wt 1(j)
Wt 1
 t
1 t
lt;
where Wt 1(j) is the predetermined nominal wage for labor j and Wt 1 is
the aggregate wage index.
Now consider the unions problem which is to maximize the members
utility:
Et
X
t [u (ct(j); lt(j))] :
For simplicity we assume that the labor is the only production factor in the
economy so that the budget constraint is
Wt 1(j)lt(j) = Ptct(j);
where Pt is the general price level and ct is consumption. Optimization leads
to the following condition
Wt 1 = t
Et 1 [ ultlt]
Et 1
h
uct
Pt
lt
i ;
where we assume a symmetric equilibrium and drop the j notation.
Finally, the rmsproblem leads to the following optimality condition:
Wt 1
Pt
= mplt:
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Therefore, the labor market equilibrium condition is
mplt =
t
Pt
Et 1 [ ultlt]
Et 1
h
uct
Pt
lt
i : (10)
Comparing (10) to the benchmark labor equilibrium condition (4):
mplt!l;t =  ul;t
uc;t
;
we can see that an unexpected deation i.e. Pt < Et 1[Pt] creates a wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption. Intuitively speaking, deation raises the
real wage that the rm must pay given the predetermined nominal wage,
and hence reduces labor demand. An increase in the unions bargaining
power also creates a wedges in the labor market. This is because a rise in
the monopoly power of labor gives an incentive for the union to demand
higher contract wages for members and as a result the labor demand will
fall. This corresponds to the mechanism proposed by Cole and Ohanian
(2004) which explains how the New Deal policies may have prolonged the
Great Depression.
A.2 Expectational Shock Model
Following Harrison and Weder (2006), the rm maximizes its prot
t = yt   wtlt   rtuk;tkt:
where
yt = A

t (uk;tkt)
 l1 t
and At represents aggregate externality. The externality is taken as exoge-
nous for individual producers and is dened as
At =
 
uk;tkt

lt
1 
where variables with   are aggregate variables. The parameter  > 0
represents the degree of externality.
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Now consider the consumers problem which is equivalent to that of the
benchmark model without labor utilization and wedges. The household max-
imizes lifetime utility
E0
P
t
t [	 ln ct + (1 	) ln (1  lt)]
subject to
wtlt + rtuk;tkt + t +  t = ct + xt:
The capital law of motion is the same as (7) in the benchmark model.
In equilibrium

yt
kt
= uk;t;
so that
yt =



 (1+)
 
k
( 1)(1+)
 
t l
(1 )(1+)
 
t :
The main feature of this model is that the labor demand curve is upward
sloping. From the labor rst order condition
wt = (1  ) yt
lt
= (1  )



 (1+)
 
k
( 1)(1+)
 
t l
(1 )(1+)
   1
t ;
if (1 )(1+)
  > 1 labor demand is increasing in wage.
This model contains multiple equilibria due to the upward sloping labor
demand curve. Imagine that there is an exogenous negative expectational
shock to the future output, yt+1. A decrease in expected lifetime income leads
to an decrease in current and future consumption and an increase in labor
supply. If the slope of the labor demand curve is steeper than the labor supply
curve, this will lead to a decrease in labor input and wages. The decrease
in current labor input leads to a decline in the current marginal product of
capital and hence a drop in capital utilization. The decrease in future labor
input leads to a fall in expected future marginal product of capital and hence
a drop in current investment. The decline in capital stock due to the drop
in investment validates the pessimistic expectation.
Comparing the capital Euler equation
1
ct
= bEt  1
ct+1

  1


yt+1
kt+1
+ 1

;
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to that in the benchmark model, (2) combined with (5),
1
ct
= bEt  1
ct+1

!k;t+1
  1


yt+1
kt+1
+ 1

;
we can see that expectational shocks can be observationally equivalent to
investment wedges.
B Estimation Results
Table A1(a). Bayesian Estimation Results: U.S.
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E.
Pee norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.6088 0.1456
Pgg norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.6546 0.1023
Pkk norm 0.5 0.5 R 1.1496 0.0766
Pll norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.6976 0.0942
Pek norm 0 0.5 R 0.1404 0.1077
Pel norm 0 0.5 R 0.2426 0.0748
Pke norm 0 0.5 R -0.3645 0.2058
Pkl norm 0 0.5 R 0.2906 0.1264
Ple norm 0 0.5 R 0.4869 0.1943
Plk norm 0 0.5 R -0.2867 0.1685
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0186 0.0034
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.2326 0.0405
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0048 0.0018
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0439 0.0071
ek beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] -0.0874 0.3377
el beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] 0.4341 0.1752
kl beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] 0.1128 0.3402
 gamma 0.9 0.05 [1;1) 1.1258 0.1010
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Table A1(b). Bayesian Estimation Results: Europe
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E.
Pee norm 0.5 0.5 R 1.0178 0.1546
Pgg norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.9632 0.0547
Pkk norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.5865 0.2314
Pll norm 0.5 0.5 R 0.9614 0.0479
Pek norm 0 0.5 R -0.3639 0.2791
Pel norm 0 0.5 R 0.0302 0.0511
Pke norm 0 0.5 R 0.1791 0.1875
Pkl norm 0 0.5 R -0.0568 0.0703
Ple norm 0 0.5 R 0.0590 0.1335
Plk norm 0 0.5 R -0.1127 0.2716
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0070 0.0014
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.1775 0.0304
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0048 0.0017
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0183 0.0033
ek beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] -0.1409 0.3265
el beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] -0.0071 0.2304
kl beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1] -0.0900 0.3437
 gamma 0.9 0.05 [1;1) 1.3216 0.2222
C Data Appendix
 Austria
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Sonderheft,
W., (1965), Oesterreichs Volkseinkommen 1913 bis 1963, Monatsberichte des
Oesterrechischen Institutes fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 14, page 38.
Employment : Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress,
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, Page 153.
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
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Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
http://www.centerfornancialstability.org/hfs.php
 Belgium
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Buyst, E.
(1997) New GNP Estimates for the Belgium Economy during the Interwar
PeriodReview of Income and Wealth, 43 (3), Table 3.
Employment : (Industrial employment without transportation sector):
Goosens, M. D. (1988), De Belgische Arbeidsmarkt Tijdens het Interbellum,
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 33 (2), Table 1.
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Denmark:
GDP : Hansen, S. V. (1974), Okonomisk vaekst I Danmark, Bind II: 1914-
1970, Akademisk Forlag, Kobenhavn, Table 1, 4.
Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Niels Kaergard
(1991), Okonomist Vaekst, Jurist-og Okonomforbundets Forlag, Table 2, 3.
Employment : Pedersen, P. J., (1974) Arbejdsstyrke og beskætigelse 1911-
70, Socialt Tidsskrift, Vol. 53 (2), pp. 31-56.
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Finland
43
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Hjerppe, R. (1996): Finlands Historical National Ac-
counts 1860-1994: Calculation Methods and Statistical Tables, Jyvaskyla:
Suomen Historian Julkaisuja, via The Nordic Historical National Accounts
Database:
http://old.nhh.no/forskning/nnb/?selected=brows/xls
Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International
Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Money Wages: Singer-Kerel, J. (1961), Le cout de la vie a Paris de 1840
a 1954, Colin.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 France
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment : The CEPII web site:
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/mode.htm
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International
Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Money Wages: Singer-Kerel, J. (1961) Le cout de la vie a Paris de 1840
a 1954, Colin, pages 536-537.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Germany
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Ritschl,
A. (2002), Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur. Binnenkonjunktur, Aus-
landsverschuldung und Reparationsproblem zwischen Dawes-Plan und Trans-
fersperre 1924-1934, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
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Employment : Ho¤mann, W.G. (1965): Das Wachstum der deutschen
Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: Springer Verlag,
Table 20.
Population: Ho¤mann, W.G. (1965): DasWachstum der deutschenWirtschaft
seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: Springer Verlag, Table 1.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Italy
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Population:
Ba¢ gi, A. (2011), Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011, Banca dItalia Eco-
nomic History Working Papers 18.
Employment : Constructed from labor force and unemployment data.
Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London, Macmillan
& Co. Ltd (for labor force, interpolated). Mitchell, B.R. (2013), Interna-
tional Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, Palgrave Macmillan: Bas-
ingstoke (for unemployment).
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 The Netherlands
GDP : Smits ,J.P., Woltjer, P.J. andMa, D. (2009), A Dataset on Compar-
ative Historical National Accounts, ca. 1870-1950: A Time-Series Perspec-
tive, Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memorandum
GD-107, Groningen: University of Groningen.
Private Consumption: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2001): Twee-
honderd jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1800-1999, Voorburg/Heerlen, 2001,
Table 9.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Groote, P., R. M. Albers and H.J. de
Jong (1996), A Standardised Time Series of the Stock of Fixed Capital in the
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Netherlands, Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memo-
randum GD-25, pp.20.
Employment : Van Ark, B. and H. J. de Jong, (1996): Accounting for
Economic Growth in the Netherlands since 1913.Groningen Growth and
Development Centre Research Memorandum GD-107, Table A.1.
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Norway
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Population:
Grytten, O. H. (2004), The Gross Domestic Product for Norway, 1830-
2003., in: Eitrheim, Ø., Klovland, J. T.,Qvigstad, Jan F. eds. Historical
Monetary Statistics for Norway, Oslo: Norges Bank.
Employment : Clark, C. (1951): The Conditions of Economic Progress,
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, page 103.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Spain
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Prados de
la Escosura, L. (2003), El progreso económico de España, 1850-2000, Madrid:
Fundación BBVA, Appendix F, H.
Employment : Prados de la Escosura, L.: mimeo
Population: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Eu-
rope 1750-2010: Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
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 Sweden
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Krantz, O. and L. Schön (2007): Swedish Historical
National Accounts, 1800-2000, Lund University Macroeconomic and Demo-
graphic Database:
http://www.ehl.lu.se/database/LU-MADD/
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 UK
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Feinstein, C. H. (1972): National Income, Expenditure
and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Table 5, 55, 59.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 US
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment : Kendrick, J. W. (1961): Productivity Trends in the United States,
Princeton University Press, Table A-IIa, A-VI.
Population, Hours Worked (in manufacturing): Carter, S., S. Gartner, M.
Haines, A. Olmstead, R. Sutch and G. Wright (2006): Historical Statistics
of the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Table Aa6-8,
Ba4592-4596.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
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